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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Juan Ramon Berber appeals from the judgment of conviction for lewd conduct.
On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred when, over his objection, it admitted
other bad act evidence, and even assuming the evidence was somehow marginally
relevant, the district court abused its discretion when it refused to conduct the requisite
balancing test prior to admitting the evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Juan Ramon Berber was charged, by amended indictment, with lewd conduct
alleged to have been committed against then-thirteen year old N.M. by way of genitalto-genital or manual-to-genital contact.

(R., pp.106-07.) According to the State, the

incident was believed to have occurred on December 31, 2008. (Tr., p.51, Ls.12-16.)
The State sought to present 404(b) evidence consisting entirely of conduct that
occurred after the incident for which Mr. Berber was charged. In describing the 404(b)
evidence, the State explained, "there's all these other instances where she [N.M.] talks
about, you know, it continued to happen.

And so we intend to introduce those."

(Tr., p.51, Ls.16-20.) That conduct included "genital-to-genital contact, genital-to-anal
contact, oral-to-genital contact, and manual-to-genital contact" that occurred both in
Idaho and California, all of which occurred after the incident for which Mr. Berber was
being prosecuted. (Tr., p.52, L.15 - p.55, L.19.)
Defense counsel objected to the 404(b) evidence, explaining that he didn't
understand how it could be admissible without "a proper showing of how it's admissible
or relevant to the actual charge."

(Tr., p.214, Ls.1-21.)
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Ultimately, the district court

ruled that the 404(b) evidence could come in because of "the fact that - that there are
other - issues other than propensity that could - that relate to this, I'm going to permit
it." (Tr., p.225, L.24 - p.226, L.4.)

In discussing the balancing test that is required

under Rule 403, the district court explained that it need not conduct such a test in this
case "because it's - it's the same individuals." (Tr., p.226, Ls.5-13.)
Throughout the trial, the State made it clear that the incident for which Mr. Berber
was being prosecuted was for the first incident of alleged conduct, which it believed
occurred on New Year's Eve of 2008. (Tr., p.51, Ls.12-17, p.53, Ls.5-12, p.244, Ls.1923 ("But there is going to be one consistent thing that she's always talked about, and
that's the defendant put his penis inside her vagina, that it hurt, that afterwards when
she went to the bathroom, it hurt again."), Tr., p.609, Ls.9-19.) This can best be seen
when examining the following portion of the State's rebuttal closing argument:
[Y]ou don't have to find that it happened on a specific date. But I submit to
you that memory of New Year's, the party she talked about, falling asleep
on the couch, that there were other people there, that that's consistent
with New Year's. People have people over. There is a party. People stay
up late. People drink.
You do have to agree on the act. And you have an option. You have
either manual-to-genital contact[1] or genital-to-genital contact. It does not
have to be both. You've heard that there was genital-to-genital contact.
And I submit to you that that's the count, the portion of this that you find
the defendant guilty of. That he put his penis inside her vagina on or

The record is devoid of any testimony by N.M. that there was any manual-to-genital
contact. (Tr., p.325, L.25 - p.327, L.11 (describing the New Year's Eve genital-togenital contact for which Mr. Berber was charged), p.330, Ls.2-20 (testifying that
genital-to-genital contact continued to occur bi-weekly), p.330, L.21 - p.338, L.9
(describing oral-to-genital contact on one occasion while driving from Idaho to
California), p.338, L.10 - p.340, L.5 (bi-weekly genital-to-genital contact while in
California), p.340, L.6 - p.344, L.1 (one incident of genital-to-anal contact), p.344, L.10
- p.346, L.25 (describing another incident of oral-to-genital contact in Idaho), p.375,
Ls.17-18 (denying any contact between Mr. Berber's penis and N.M.'s hand), p.378,
Ls.4-6 (same), p.383, Ls.18-19 (same), p.394, Ls.14-23 (describing the two incidents of
oral-to-genital contact).)
2
1

about New Year's Eve after he'd gained her trust. Moved in with her and
had her completely away from her father.
(Tr., p.620, L.20 - p.621, L.10 (emphasis added).)
Following a jury trial at which other bad act testimony concerning a wide range of
alleged sexual misconduct, including oral, anal, and vaginal sex occurring in at least two
states over the course of nearly a year, Mr. Berber was found guilty of lewd conduct for
the incident alleged to have occurred on December 31, 2008. (Tr., p.637, Ls.5-14.)
Mr. Berber filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.212.)

3

ISSUE

Did the district court err when it permitted the presentation of irrelevant propensity
evidence in violation of Rule 404(b), and abuse its discretion when it admitted the other
bad acts evidence without conducting the requisite balancing test?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Permitted The Presentation Of Irrelevant Propensity
Evidence In Violation Of Rule 404(b), And Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted The
Other Bad Acts Evidence Without Conducting The Requisite Balancing Test
A.

Introduction
The State sought to present 404(b) evidence of conduct that occurred after the

incident for which Mr. Berber was charged.

In describing the evidence, the State

explained that Mr. Berber was being prosecuted for an incident that occurred on
December 31, 2008. (Tr., p.51, Ls.12-16.) In describing the 404(b) evidence, the State
explained, "there's all these other instances where she [the victim] talks about, you
know, it continued to happen. And so we intend to introduce those." (Tr., p.51, Ls.1620.) That conduct included "genital-to-genital contact, genital-to-anal contact, oral-togenital contact, and manual-to-genital contact" that occurred both in Idaho and
California, all of which occurred after the incident for which Mr. Berber was being
prosecuted. (Tr., p.52, L.15 - p.55, L.19.)
Defense counsel objected to the 404(b) evidence, explaining that he didn't
understand how it could be admitted without "a proper showing of how it's admissible or
relevant to the actual charge." (Tr., p.214, Ls.1-21.) Ultimately, the district court ruled
that the 404(b) evidence was admissible because of "the fact that - that there are other
- issues other than propensity that could - that relate to this, I'm going to permit it."
(Tr., p.225, L.24 - p.226, L.4.) In discussing the requisite balancing test of the probative
versus prejudicial value of the evidence, the district court explained that it need not
conduct such a test "because it's - it's the same individuals." (Tr., p.226, Ls.5-13.)
Mr. Berber asserts that the district court erred when, over his objection, it
concluded that other bad acts evidence was not propensity evidence and was relevant
5

under Rule 404(b ).

Additionally, even assuming such evidence was somehow

minimally relevant, the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the evidence
after refusing to conduct the requisite balancing test.

B.

Standards Of Review

1.

404(b) Determination

When reviewing a district court's decision to admit other bad acts evidence under
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), appellate courts review the relevancy determination de

nova. See State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 824 (Ct. App. 2009).

Review of the

district court's balancing of the probative versus prejudicial value of the evidence is for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009).

2.

Abuse Of Discretion

When a district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate
court conducts a three part inquiry to determine whether that discretion was abused.
First, the district court must have perceived the issue as one of discretion. Second, the
district court must have acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any applicable legal standards.
reached its decision in an exercise of reason.

Third, the district court must have

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600

(1989).

C.

The District Court Erred Because The Evidence Was Irrelevant Propensity
Evidence
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), in relevant part, provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
6

proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident ....
I.R.E. 404(b).

Mr. Berber asserts that none of the exceptions in Rule 404(b) apply to render the
other bad act evidence relevant and admissible in his case. As such, the district court
committed legal error in determining that the other bad act evidence was relevant.
In Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified that there is no special exception to
Rule 404(b)'s exclusion of character and propensity evidence for child sex abuse cases,
holding instead that the same considerations apply regardless of the type of crime or
the status of the alleged victim. Grist, 147 Idaho at 55.
First, it is worth disposing of the exceptions that cannot possibly apply in this
case. Identity is not at issue in this case; either Mr. Berber committed the act for which
he was charged or he did not. Any motive Mr. Berber may have had was not at issue in
this case. The only motive that could have been at issue would be whether the charged
act was done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desires of either Mr. Berber or
N.M., and Mr. Berber's defense was that he did not commit the charged act, not that he

committed the charged act without sexual motivation. (See Tr., p.556, L.4 - p.557, L.4.)
That leaves opportunity, intent, preparation, knowledge, and absence of mistake or
accident as potentially applying.

For the reasons set forth below, the other bad act

evidence was not relevant under any of these remaining exceptions.

1.

Corroboration By Common Scheme Or Plan

In State v. Joy,_ Idaho_, 304 P.3d 276, 284 (2013), the Idaho Supreme Court
considered the trial court's decision to admit evidence of other bad acts of sexual and
physical violence alleged to have been committed by the defendant against his wife in a
7

trial for an incident of abuse that purportedly occurred several months later.

In

discussing the corroboration by common scheme or plan exception, 2 the Court
explained,
[T]o be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior misconduct must
show more than a superficial similarity to the nature and details of the
charged conduct, but must instead show that the defendant's charged and
uncharged conduct is linked in a way that permits the inference that the
prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the
charged offense.

Joy,_ Idaho at_, 304 P.3d at 285.
In Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that, when considering whether to
admit other bad acts evidence "for purposes of 'corroboration' as demonstrating a
'common scheme or plan,"' the trial court "must carefully scrutinize the evidence" sought
to be presented "in order to determine whether such evidence actually serves the
articulated purpose or whether such evidence is merely propensity evidence served up
under a different name." Grist, 147 Idaho at 55.
In light of the fact that the other bad act evidence in Mr. Berber's trial occurred
after the conduct for which he is charged, it is impossible for the subsequent bad acts to

have been part of a common scheme or plan to commit the charged act. Additionally,
the district court did not, as required under Grist, subject any of the evidence to
"careful[] scrutiny" to determine whether it actually served the articulated purpose as
opposed to representing merely propensity evidence.

The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that the exceptions for preparation, plan,
knowledge, and identity "are most frequently grouped together under the rubric of
'common scheme or plan."' Grist, 147 Idaho at 54.

2

8

2.

Opportunity

With respect to the opportunity exception, it is unclear how evidence concerning
subsequent alleged assaults was relevant to show an opportunity to commit the

charged act. Neither the State nor the district court articulated how such evidence was
relevant to the opportunity exception.

Additionally, the details of the other alleged

assaults were either absent or markedly different from those underlying the charged
conduct.
Specifically, while N.M. acknowledged that genital-to-genital contact continued to
occur bi-weekly after the first alleged incident, she did not provide specifics as to where
or how the conduct was accomplished (i.e., whether it occurred in the same place (her
bedroom with her brother present) or under similar circumstances (while her mother
was at home but in another part of the house)). (Tr., p.330, Ls.2-20.) With respect to
the genital-to-genital contact that purportedly occurred in California, N.M. testified that it
occurred while she was alone in a shared bedroom, without any of her siblings present,
unlike the charged conduct. (Tr., p.338, L.12 - p.339, L.8.)
Finally, with respect to N.M.'s testimony concerning an incident of anal sex in
California and two incidents of oral-to-genital contact, it is unclear how such incidents,
especially in light of the fact that one of the oral-to-genital incidents purportedly occurred
while Mr. Berber was driving a truck to California, would be relevant to show an
opportunity to have committed the charged genital-to-genital conduct months earlier in
the bedroom of a house in Idaho. In light of the fact that none of the other bad acts
evidence was relevant to the issue of opportunity to commit the charged conduct, this
could not have served as a basis for finding the evidence relevant.
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Furthermore, even assuming the other alleged incidents of genital-to-genital
contact in both Idaho and California were relevant for this purpose, the incident of anal
sex in California and the testimony concerning oral-to-genital sex during which
Mr. Berber, while driving, purportedly ejaculated into N.M.'s mouth was not relevant for
this purpose.

3.

Absence Of Mistake Or Accident

With respect to the absence of mistake or accident exception, it is important to
note that Mr. Berber never presented as a defense that he committed the act underlying
the charged conduct but did so only accidentally or that N.M. mistook his intent in
engaging in the charged conduct. As such, it was not proper to conclude that the other
bad act evidence was relevant to show an absence of mistake or accident. This case is
different from the situation presented in State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho 217 (1998), in which
the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether testimony about a masseur's improper
touching of several of his adult clients was properly admitted to rebut the defendant's
testimony that his touching of the genitals and breasts of a sixteen year old female client
was either accidental (with respect to the genital contact) or done for therapeutic
purposes (with respect to the breast contact). Cardell, 132 Idaho at 219-20. Unlike the
situation in Cardell, Mr. Berber categorically denied any manual-to-genital or genital-togenital contact, and did not rely upon a claim of mistake or accident. (See Tr., p.556,
L.4 - p.557, L.4.)
Furthermore, even assuming that allegations of subsequent incidents of genitalto-genital contact were somehow relevant to show an absence of mistake or accident in
the charged conduct, there is no logic under which testimony concerning the incidents
of anal and oral sex could be relevant for such a purpose.
10

With respect to the intent exception, it is worth noting that in State v. Roach, 109
Idaho 973 (Ct. App. 1985), the Idaho Court of Appeals explained that the intent
exception cannot always apply in cases, otherwise other bad act evidence would nearly
always be relevant under the exception. Roach, 109 Idaho at 975. In Roach, the Court
of Appeals held that other bad acts were not relevant under the intent exception
because the defendant, charged with lewd conduct, had specifically denied committing
the acts and made no claim that he had done so only innocently.

Id.

Mr. Berber's

testimony was similar to that of the defendant in Roach: he denied committing the acts
at all.

Because intent was not an issue in Mr. Berber's case, the other bad acts

evidence was not relevant under Rule 404(b).
Because the other bad acts evidence was not relevant under any of the
exceptions set forth in Rule 404(b), the district court committed legal error in admitting
the evidence. Mr. Berber objected to the admission of the evidence, and as such, in
order to avoid reversal, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
testimony concerning months of additional alleged abuse, including anal and oral sex,
did not play any role in the jury's decision as to the one charged incident of genital-togenital contact.

Because the State will be unable to meet this burden, Mr. Berber

respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, and remand this matter for a
new trial at which irrelevant propensity evidence is not presented.

D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Refused To Conduct The
Requisite Balancing Test
In the alternative to his argument that the other bad acts evidence was irrelevant,

Mr. Berber maintains that, even assuming the other bad act evidence was somehow
11

marginally relevant under 404(b), the district court abused its discretion when it
affirmatively refused to conduct the requisite balancing test under Rule 403 as to
whether the relevance of the other bad acts evidence was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. Specifically, the district court reasoned,
And the third prong that I've - that I'm going to make reference to,
although I've impliedly done so, is where the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. And that is not
a factor here, because it's - it's the same individuals. And I think the
testimony is going to be something that either is given - I mean, either the
jury will find that credible or they won't find it credible. So that's my ruling.
(Tr., p.226, Ls.5-13 (emphasis added).)
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, in relevant part, provides, "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice." I.R.E. 403. With respect to Rule 403's balancing test, the
Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "Only after using this balancing test, may a trial
judge use his discretion to properly admit or exclude the proffered evidence."
Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107,110 (1987).

Nothing in the text of Rule 403 indicates an exception for conduct involving the
same parties, and Mr. Berber is unaware of any case law that establishes such an
exception. In fact, Idaho case law suggests otherwise. See Joy, _ Idaho at_, 304
P.3d at 284 (2013) (setting forth 404(b) analysis, including application of Rule 403's
balancing test, before discussing admission of prior bad act alleged to have been
committed by defendant against the same victim); 3 see a/so State v. Coleman, 152
Idaho 872, 878 n.1 (Ct. App. 2012) (noting that it need not consider the district court's
Rule 403 analysis because it found the evidence to be irrelevant under 404(b)) (citation
The Idaho Supreme Court never considered the district court's Rule 403 analysis
because it found that the evidence was not relevant under any of the exceptions to Rule
404(b). Joy,_ Idaho at_, 304 P.3d at 284-86.
3
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omitted). Additionally, the Arizona Court of Appeals has held that the balancing test
required under Arizona's similar rule must be conducted even when the other bad acts
evidence involves the same victim. See State v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 327 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2001).
Because the district court did not act within the outer boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the applicable legal standards, it abused its discretion when it
affirmatively refused to conduct the requisite balancing test before admitting the other
bad acts evidence. Furthermore, even if the district court had conducted the requisite
balancing test, it would have abused its discretion in admitting the other bad acts
evidence in light of the minimal, if any, relevance 4 that the evidence had and the
substantial prejudice that its admission had. 5 As such, assuming this Court rejects
Mr. Berber's argument that the evidence was irrelevant propensity evidence, it should
nevertheless vacate the conviction and remand this matter for a new trial at which such
overwhelmingly prejudicial evidence is not admitted.

Mr. Berber maintains that the evidence was irrelevant propensity evidence. He argues
only that the evidence had minimal relevance in the alternative to the claim advanced in
his primary argument.
5 This claim is even stronger with respect to the evidence concerning allegations of anal
and oral sex, as well as the allegations of conduct that purportedly occurred outside of
Idaho.
4
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Berber respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial at which the
other bad acts evidence is not admitted.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2013.
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